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In this case, the continual reinstatement of white-
ness as the centre of species relation. This centering 
enacts a fictive mode of truth, or what Lewis Gordon 
defines as a white prototypicality that understands 
itself as the standard through which the ideal model 
of species exists.2 Gordon turns to Wynter’s interpre-
tation of Fanon to illustrate the psychic strain this 
imposes on the racialised figure within an autopoi-
etically instituted living system.
Humberto Maturana, Francisco Varela and 
Ricardo Uribe developed the concept of autopoiesis 
to explain the phenomenon of living organisms and 
their cognitive capacities.3 An autopoietic system, 
therefore, is an enclosed and autonomous system 
that distinguishes living from non-living systems. 
It describes living organisms as ‘self-producing’ and 
the nature of perception and intelligence as sub-
ject-dependent. Autopoiesis is also a generative pro-
cess of recursive re-creation, particularly of the self. 
According to Maturana, Varela and Uribe, an auto-
poietic system is realised in a particular structure and 
is independent of its environment.4 
A key point of the concept of autopoiesis is 
the relation Maturana, Varela and Uribe establish 
between closed recurrent systems and cognition. 
2. Lewis R. Gordon., “Is the Human a Teleological Suspension of Man? 
Phenomenological Exploration of Sylvia Wynter’s Fanonian and Biodicean 
Reflections,” in After Man, Towards the Human: Critical Essays on the soul of Sylvia 
Wynter, ed. by Anthony Bogues. Kingston: Ian Randle, 2006.
3. Humberto R. Maturana,. Francisco J. Varela. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization 
of the Living. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, v. 42. Dordrecht, Holland ; 
Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co, 1980.
4. For a detailed description of Maturana and Varela’s concept of autopoiesis, see John 
Mingersn. “The Cognitive Theories of Maturana and Varela.” Systems Practice 4, no. 
4 (August 1991): 319–38.
In The Ceremony Found: Towards the Autopoetic 
Turn/Overturn, its Autonomy of Human Agency and 
Extraterritoriality of (Self-)Cognition, Sylvia Wynter 
introduces the concept of autopoetically instituted 
living. For Wynter, autopoetic instituted living is a 
dynamic site of empirical ordering, set forth by the 
conditions of colonialism and the extension of the 
humanist project into the construction of the ideal 
form of Man.  The architecture of this project was 
dependent upon, as Kara Keeling has argued, the 
positioning of the racialised body as visible only in as 
much as they could be brought into being via empir-
ical forms of knowledge. As consequence—return-
ing to Wynter—these spatio-temporal coordinates 
are not only predicated on the humanist imaginary, 
but also constitute a “lawlike correlation between our 
modes of knowledge production and the auto-insti-
tution of our social realities.” 1
The auto-institution of social reality is an 
important notion in Wynter’s thesis, as it illuminates 
the colonial relation as the product of an extensive 
network of data that are extracted from the site of 
the colonial co-ordinate—a co-ordinate that com-
prises what she calls the bioepisteme, an operative 
function that replicated the ordering of social real-
ity through data and the imaginary of hierarchy. For 
Wynter, however, this system is recurrent, organic, 
and self-producing of the relations found within it. 
1. Sylvia Wynter. “The Ceremony Found: towards the autopoetic turn/overturn, its 
autonomy of Human agency and extraterritoriality of (self-)cognition,” in Black 
Knowledges/Black Struggles, ed. by Jason R. Ambroise and Sabine Broeck. Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 2015, 203.
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Wynter also associates the construction of 
autopoietic social praxis with the instrumental-
isation of science. To do so, she turns to the epis-
teme—a scientific term also adopted by Foucault in 
Archaeolog y of Knowledge to describe the coexistence 
of a set of relations that form the conditions of pos-
sibility (or knowledge) in a given historical period.8 
Foucault initially restricts the episteme to the distri-
bution of scientific knowledge as a mode of power, 
but expands the concept in later writings to account 
for other forms of knowledge produced outside of 
scientific academy.  As Foucault has argued, they 
remain invisible, concealed or ‘epistemologically 
unconscious’.9  Foucault has shown that the epis-
teme operates under discrete forms of mundane 
practices and solutions. Furthermore, the episteme 
is a means by which the Other is not only brought 
into being, but made visible as difference in itself. 
Here, the Other embodies the normalising forces 
of power—in this sense instrumental reason, which 
is executed under the democratisation of calculus. 
By this, Foucault means the integration of dynamic 
modes of ordering and organisation in society. These 
forces are strengthened through the enforcement of 
the right to disseminate rhetorical truths.
An immediate parallel is drawn between 
Foucault’s outline of power and subject composi-
tion and Fanon’s assessment of colonialism as well as 
the constitution of the colonial subject—a proposal 
8. Michel Foucaultl. Archaeolog y of Knowledge. New York: Routledge, 2002, 211.
9. Keith Alber Sandiford t. Theorizing a Colonial Caribbean-Atlantic Imaginary: Sugar and 
Obeah. Routledge Research in Atlantic Studies 5. New York: Routledge, 2011.
In general, cognition refers to the assimilation and 
use of knowledge, and as such is limited to beings 
with complex nervous systems.5 Although research 
on cognition has advanced significantly, Maturana, 
Varela and Uribe believe that both cognition and 
perception are linked in the operation of the nervous 
system, which is realised through the autopoiesis of 
the organism. Since the survival of autopoietic sys-
tems depends on the continuation of recurrent inter-
actions, consequently, the organism retains a knowl-
edge, if only implicitly, that extends to cover the 
organism’s various interactions. In other words, as 
Maturana et. al. describe, the organisation of cogni-
tive systems themselves define the domains through 
which they act.6 
In applying the autopoietic schema to the 
colonial imaginary, Wynter grasps the layered pat-
terns of global systems of knowledge, such as colonial 
and imperial expansion, which function as categorical 
systems that both produce and reinforce cultural and 
political ideologies through a series of code.7 Wynter 
surmises that the enactment of the code of what con-
stitutes colonised life operates at the level of the psy-
che which is furthermore entangled in a society’s sys-
tem of learning. It is believed that these codes must 
necessarily correlate or even determine the study of 
humans, nature and the terms of social praxis.
5. John Mingers. “The Cognitive Theories of Maturana and Varela.” Systems Practice 4, 
no. 4 (August 1991): 319–38.
6. Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela. Autopoiesis and Cognition: The 
Realization of the Living.
7. David Marriott. “Inventions of Existence: Sylvia Wynter, Frantz Fanon, Sociogeny, 
and ‘the Damned’.” The New Centennial Review 11, no. 3 (2012): 45-89.
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ously within the composition of the colonised. The 
colonised body, in this sense, lives as a universal form 
of history yet is exposed as the negation of life itself 
in the physiological expression of the present. 
The result is what Simone Browne calls ‘digi-
tal epidermalization’, or methods by which power is 
exercised through the disembodiment of the Other 
under the gaze of surveillance and other technolo-
gies.10 Here, Browne demonstrates the fragility of 
the technological gaze which is enacted under the 
alienating logics of truth and categorical reasoning. 
Nonetheless, in doing so, Browne builds upon the 
dissonant relationship blacks have had historically 
with Anglo-centric technologies. As Browne argues, 
understanding this relation is fundamental to any 
discourse on surveillance and the ethics of technol-
ogy. This is particularly important considering the 
prevalence of discourse today that centres the tech-
nical object as the subject of investigation without 
thorough (if any) insight into how these technol-
ogies and the social space are shaped by colonial-
ism and imperial expansion. By connecting data to 
power and knowledge, researchers can be implored 
to consider how data might replicate the immedia-
cies of discrimination and determinacy. As Browne 
has shown, the logics of classification are enduring 
in their ability to stall the building of self-knowledge 
in the present while also regulating the existence of 
10. Simone Browne. Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness. Durham, North 
Carolina: Duke University Press, 2015.
Fanon puts forth in his Tunis lectures, arguably prior 
to Foucault’s notion of biopolitics. While both Fanon 
and Foucault are concerned with the distribution 
of power, their schematics depart in their unique 
treatments of the initial conditions from which the 
Other is constituted. On the one hand, Foucault pre-
supposes a more general distribution of the means 
of power that brings the Other into view.  Although 
Fanon does not mention Foucault explicitly, he is 
critical of discourse that prioritises the means of sub-
jection as universally embodied.
Fanon places particular emphasis on the con-
struction of race as the negation of being, where the 
subject is brought into being only as much as it can 
be disregarded as a non-subject or the subject of non 
being. In Black Skin, White Masks, he argues that 
this epistemic relation—or what he describes as a 
‘drama’ of discovery—precedes the Enlightenment 
principles of Man and the fantasy of a world built in 
his image. Fanon, like Foucault, situates surveillance 
as a mode of visibility, a technology through which 
colonialism distributes power as a suspicion of the 
Other. For Fanon, the colonial view is as much a part 
of the constitution of the colonised as is the embod-
ied effects of biological sorting. This composition 
extends beyond the corporeal body and into the 
universal perception of blackness, which is exposed 
by stereotypes and emboldened by the distributed 
power of interpellation. It re-articulates the fram-
ing of life and death, put forward by Foucault and 
Mbembe, as that which instead exhausts simultane-
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characteristic of post-modern life, has also become a 
source of value to be realised on the market for com-
modified information.” 13 
With the power of statistics, Gandy warns that 
while data renders individuals visible for governance, 
it has very real and immediate effects on the life 
chances of black and racialised people. According to 
Gandy, the regulatory of effects of data—as marked 
by race, gender, and socioeconomic bias—disad-
vantage some populations while privileging others, 
even though both are often read, discursively, as if 
they exist under the same universal scope of pow-
er.14 Transactions of the every day, from credit card 
transactions, online payments and browsing habits, 
customer reward programmes, barcode scans, dig-
ital access points, biometric sampling to job appli-
cations and drug testing are just a few examples of 
the means by which blacks are targeted for exploita-
tion, discrimination, redlining, criminality and sus-
picion, as described in the Introduction. As Gandy 
suggests, any discourse on the biopolitical impact 
of data should extend beyond the general sites of 
data to consider how the inequitable distribution of 
power aligns with the inequitable impositions of race 
and capitalism. 
Gandy’s critique of statistics is warranted, 
given the role mathematics has played in the order-
ing of life. Laplace had already shown that early 
studies in probability theory by Pascal and Fermat 
13. Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V.  Ericson.. “The Surveillant Assemblage.
14. See also: Solon Barocasn. “Data Mining and the Discourse on Discrimination.” In 
Proceedings of the Data Ethics Workshop, 4, 2014.
certain bodies, even after death. They also speak to 
the immediate shaping of public space. 
In The Panoptic Sort: Political Economy of 
Personal Information, Oscar H. Gandy also considers 
the roles data and classification play in “the reduc-
tion of life chances” under, what he terms “a panop-
tic sort of data.”11 Gandy conceives of the panoptic 
sort as a type of data that extends beyond general 
surveillance and the panoptic paradigms of disci-
plinary power, as theorised by Foucault. The pan-
optic sort is an ‘all-seeing’ discriminatory apparatus 
that classifies individuals on the basis of their esti-
mated economic or political value, and is continu-
ally optimised for the efficient transfer of value into 
data and information that, as argued above, dislo-
cates and reassembles bodies under the temporal 
and spatial objectives of the institutions that ‘own’ 
and circulate the data.12 
For Gandy, statistical classifications re-con-
figure the universal position of surveillance, as they 
typically have a disproportionate effect on black and 
racialised individuals. As such, they become the clas-
sification of blacks which then becomes a key char-
acteristic of capital exchange, as well health, educa-
tion, and other institutional policies. As Haggerty 
and Ericson describe, “the moving about between 
environments and activities that has become a key 
11. Oscar H Gandy.. The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information. Critical 
Studies in Communication and in the Cultural Industries. Boulder: Westview  
Press, 1993.
12. Kevin D. Haggerty ,and Richard V Ericson.. “The Surveillant Assemblage.” British 
Journal of Sociolog y 51, no. 4 (December 1, 2000): 605–22. See l:so: David Lyon: . 
Surveillance after September 11. Themes for the 21st Century. Malden, Mass: Polity 
Press in association with Blackwell Pub. Inc, 2003.
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calculated and predicted with verifiable certainty. 
Laplace describes the extraordinary justification of 
this embrace as such:
Given for one instant an intelligence which could 
comprehend all the forces by which nature is ani-
mated and the respective situation of the beings who 
compose it—an intelligence sufficiently vast to sub-
mit these data to analysis—it would embrace in the 
same formula the movements of the greatest bodies 
of the universe and those of the lightest atom; for it, 
nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the 
past, would be present to its eyes.16
Laplace’s attempt at regulating the dynamism of 
human decision-making might have been a failed sci-
entific project, but he had succeeded in reinforcing 
a mode of thought; that the phenomenon of indi-
vidual life, despite its seemingly erratic unfolding, 
was merely a derivative of a single, simple substance 
of nature. As result, the individual state of being 
was thought to materialise at the limits of scientific 
observation. It was furthermore subordinated to an 
existence, a law, above and beyond the specificities 
of each individual’s life. Laplace’s magic theory had 
great influence on later statistical theory in the man-
agement and organisation of variability. For instance, 
in Bayesian probability (which is a simple mathemati-
cal formula that reduces complex variables into sym-
bolic representations of probable truths), variable 
16.  Marquis De Laplace, as quoted in Hacking, 12.
could be used to demonstrate universal lines of rea-
son.15 Although Pascal and Fermat were primarily 
interested in assessing probability through gam-
bling risk, it was Laplace who first introduced the 
idea of statistical succession, or the notion that an 
underlying probability could be estimated with 
few direct observations. Interestingly, Laplace 
 experimented with his proposition using the court 
of law. By applying the rule of succession to data 
collected from archived jury decisions, Laplace the-
orised that one could state, with a given amount of 
certainty, the likelihood a juror would assign inno-
cence or guilt.
Laplace’s model introduced elements of 
perceived certainty into an otherwise dynamic 
and contingent legal system. His model was one of 
pre-emption. It made use of mathematics to correlate 
seemingly disparate details of dynamic life. In the 
case of jury decision, the formula took into account 
historical data on various types of material evidences 
and their influences on individual juror perception. 
The rule of succession did not stand in for the law of 
the people, as was thought desirable, but for a new 
overriding law of nature that, as Laplace argued, was 
more robust than its more contingent human coun-
terparts. Laplace believed that if one could only fun-
nel the patterns of nature into symbolic form, then 
other behavioural phenomena, from the single jury 
decision to the regular movement of sun, could be 
15.  Ian Hacking. The Taming of Chance. Ideas in Context. Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990.
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each stage of learning, prior knowledges are unnec-
essary in the production of insight. They assert that 
debates on the subjective are mis-aligned with the 
aims of probabilistic learning, as probabilities are not 
expected to replicate target functions perfectly from 
their origin. Instead, they contend that probabilities 
are meant to approximate correlation in controlled 
environments, with an awareness that performance 
outside of the laboratory may vary. 
To the contrary, critics assert that the fragil-
ity of these types of Humean hypotheses originate 
in the priority they place on scientific judgement. 
Humean inductive reasoning prioritises the number 
of observable instances in establishing a relationship 
with the production of knowledge. For Hume, scien-
tific judgement is based on the probability of observ-
able outcome: the more instances, the more probable 
the predicted conclusion.
Michael Wood has written that without a 
more complete understanding of the role of the 
subjective within the determination of probabilities, 
they remain assessments of ignorance and judge-
ment. Wood states: “if, for practical reasons, sam-
ples are not selected randomly, the question then 
arises of whether they can reasonably be regarded 
as if they were selected randomly. This is a matter 
of judgement.”18 The matter of judgement is what 
Gandy sees as the fundamental determinant of sub-
ject position. “How we evaluate people, places and 
18.  Michael Wood. Making Sense of Statistics: A Non-Mathematical Approach. Nachdr. 
Palgrave Study Guides. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004.
estimates can be adjusted on the basis of dynamic 
observational assumptions. This result is the further 
simplification of data into more manageable variables 
that are easier to calculate. Bayesian reasoning is an 
essential tool in machine learning and artificial intel-
ligence research today, which operates in highly com-
plex and contingent environments. It is an attractive 
tool for machine learning and AI researchers, since 
the techniques enhance computational speed while 
optimising algorithmic power.
Given Laplace’s prior attempts to substantiate 
a new theory of probability theory from within the 
criminal justice system, it is no surprise that statistics 
has found its way into the contemporary racialised 
episteme of machine learning, the cousin of statis-
tics. In machine learning and artificial intelligence, 
probabilities raise additional concerns about scale. 
Large scale applications can consist of hundreds 
or thousands of variable inputs, each holding their 
own margins of error. Stacking these errors risks the 
extension of probabilistic determinations beyond 
what is justifiable. Nonetheless, Abu-Mostafa, et. 
al. argue that a probabilistic view can produce sat-
isfactory results without assumptions outside of 
those produced independent of the hypothesis.17 
Advocates assert that, in many cases, experts are 
trained to intuit the forms of uncertainty present. 
They insist that as long as engineers use the same 
distributions consistently for each problem set in 
17.  Yaser S. Abu-Mostafa, , Malik Magdon-Ismail, and Hsuan-Tien Lin. Learning from 
Data: A Short Course. S.l.: AMLbook.com, 2012.
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cient account of the logics that enable the operation 
of empirical apparatuses. I argue that the empirical 
objects and processes that Wynter and Fanon describe 
are underwritten by the accumulation, management 
and classification of data derived from the system of 
observation. This is an important claim since Wynter 
and Fanon are less explicit about the origin of empir-
ically-enabled data.
I posit that these violences are crucial compo-
nents, even unwittingly, in the operation of artificial 
intelligence and machine learning.  My goal—given 
the roles of bioepistemic epidermalization (Wynter/
Fanon/Browne) and white prototypicality (Gordon) 
in organising space and time—is to understand 
what capacities machine learning and AI then have 
to reinforce or reinstate the colonial imaginary.  This 
is important since, as Adrian Mackenzie argues, 
“Machine learners today circulate into domains that 
lie afield of the eugenic and psychology laboratories, 
industrial research institutes, or specialised engineer-
ing settings in which they first took shape.”21 In this 
way, our contemporary encounters with data extend 
well beyond notions of design, ease of use, personal 
suggestion, surveillance or privacy. They take on new 
meaning if we consider the underlying principles of 
mathematics as the engine that drives data towards 
languages of normality and truth prior to any opera-
tional discomforts or violences.
21.  Adrian Mackenzie. Machine Learners: Archaeolog y of a Data Practice. Cambridge, MA: 
The MIT Press, 2017, 6.
things in terms of their departure from what we 
have defined as the norm,” Gandy states, “is often a 
fundamental determinant of the position they will 
come to occupy in still other distributions that we 
have yet to consider.”19
It is worth it at this juncture to return to 
the wider logic of enumeration that have informed 
these processes, what Wynter describes as the eugenic 
descent, or the operational decline imposed by the 
colonial episteme. Wynter’s adoption of this point of 
reference extends the artificiality of regulated attri-
butes into the substances of class, sexual orientation 
and race. Her claim is sustained by the creation of 
what she describes as eugenic/dysgenic selection.20 
The coherence of racialised attributes, in this sense, 
what I call the fictive substance of race, links the 
dynamic instrumentalisation of coherence found 
in the bioepistemic to the “discursive negation of 
co-humaness.” In this way, I draw closer to validating 
Fanon’s claim that colonial perception is a discur-
sive practice that is self maintaining in its capacity to 
empirically self-justify.
He also stipulates that the apparatuses of 
empiricism, such as the assembly line and the dis-
cretisation of time, are appropriated to enact the 
management and organisation of space. These appa-
ratuses speak to the materialisation of certain com-
ponents and process. They are not, however, a suffi-
19.  Oscar H. Gandy. Coming to Terms with Chance: Engaging Rational Discrimination and 
Cumulative Disadvantage. London: Routledge, 2016, 4.
20.  Sylvia Wynter. “The ceremony Found: towards the autopoetic turn/overturn, its 
autonomy of Human agency and extraterritoriality of (self-)cognition.”
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borrowing from Fred Moten, as an aspirational black 
life that can gain a right of refusal to representation? 
As such, would a universal computational gaze limit 
the self-determination of those that have little or no 
desire for inclusion in machine perception? Without 
a wider scope, debates on these matters remain 
incomplete in their characterization of algorithmic 
prejudices and social discriminations. Attempts at 
reconciling this arguably unsettled debate rely on 
a commitment to sufficiently characterise the con-
stitution of a more affirmative process of machinic 
existence that can gain a totality in relation to arti-
ficial modes of perception. The proposal asks us to 
consider what is overlooked in machine learning 
and AI research, and instead consider it as already 
an act of colonial thought. In doing so, my hope is 
to dislodge both the ontological and functional pro-
cesses of machine learning and AI from their roots 
in substantialist metaphysics and Aristotelian modes 
of truth. Machine learning and AI here necessitate a 
new reflexive position that can generate alternative 
levels of operation.
A revision of this field demands a return 
to the system of relation from the perspective of a 
multivalent—non white centred—mode of reality. 
I draw on Gilbert Simondon’s concept of psychic and 
collective individuation to argue that the reconciliation 
of black being—the black technical object, as such, 
does not deny historical negation, but can ,through 
this duress generate new forms of being and becom-
So what are we to do in our current empirical reality, 
or I could say data-informed lives? How are we to dis-
rupt the distributions of power that are amplified by 
data and advanced learning systems? It is here that 
I think through the object—the black object as the 
technical object—as a site of affirmative potential 
or a kinetic dissonance and dynamic incoherence 
at the very basis of being. If we are to consider the 
photogenic object in contemporary spaces of algo-
rithmic culture, it is apparent that the black tech-
nical object is always-already pre-conditioned by an 
affective prelogic of race that functions on the level 
of the psyche.22 The possibility of an affirmative 
engagement between the black technical object and 
the algorithm, as a technical object, is then limited 
by the necessity to reconcile the psychic potential 
of the racialised individual with that of a pre-deter-
mined technical structure. Although the immedi-
acy of computation’s lack of diversity—in terms of 
institutional value and algorithmic function—can-
not be understated, a call to make black technical 
objects compatible to machine learning and artifi-
cial intelligence algorithms risks the further reduc-
tion of the lived potentiality of black life. As I have 
argued, the consequences for the black technical 
object are immense.
It must be asked if the black technical object 
can be conceptualised as outside of the dialectic 
between human and machine? Is there such a thing, 
22. Ramon Amaro.. ‘As If,’ e-flux architecture, 97, accessed April 26, 2019,  
www.e-flux.com/architecture/becoming-digital/248073/as-if/.
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geneity and the perceived stability of categories to 
instead engage in a transformative politics of affir-
mative self belonging—what bell hooks might call a 
‘communion’,where the entropic individual exceeds 
the barriers of social relations to enter an alternative 
space of becoming—made possible by a reimagin-
ing of the self. In other words, the unusable, uncom-
mon, and thus incomputable individual potentia-
lises the social space toward new ways of relating 
and relation. As journalist Alex Greenberger writes 
of Whitten’s work:
Whitten utilized an unconventional process for 
which he would lay the canvas on the f loor, drag 
a squeegee across to mix his color, and then let the 
paint dry. Paint was piled on as much as a quar-
ter-inch thick in many of them, and all of the tones 
Whitten chose were left visible. With their warped, 
colorful forms and their unclear geometries, they 
resemble long-exposure photographs of things in 
motion… Whitten relinquished some control over 
his canvases, leaving the final results to chance in 
some respects. To test the ways that time and tools 
affected the painting process became Whitten’s 
mandate.
What if we were to take Whitten’s mandate at face 
value as we confront the duress of the machine—in 
much of the same way that Whitten addressed the 
suffocating atmosphere of race and racism in the 
1960s? What if machine learning were less ‘gestural’ 
ing. Simondon argues that “psychic and collective 
individuation incessantly and persistently creates 
being as it advances, maintaining in each created or 
individuated scope of being.” 23 I locate my argument 
here to suggest that although difference brings forth 
a consistency of relations between objects (be they 
human, technological, or structural), these relations 
are not pre-determinate. To the contrary, difference 
presupposes the material presence of contradiction 
and incompatibility. Here, we can imagine a techni-
cal object—a black technical object—that develops 
an indifference to description or any other form of 
artificial representation. It would maintain—as has 
been illustrated in the black abstract painting of Jack 
Whitten, a radical diversion from the prototypical 
figure to confront and dismantle the hard struc-
tures of Truth.
Here, if symbolism is enacted, it is not in the 
service of mathematics, but in the abstraction of 
black life. As Whitten states in his 1970s painting 
‘Homage to Malcolm X’, it would have to be some-
thing that would enact “that feeling of going deep 
down into something and in doing that I was able to 
capture the essence of what” —these are my words 
now, blackness is all about. Black being, as such, 
actualises as an experience that is lived from both 
within and in excess of artificial modes of percep-
tion and the fictive imaginaries of race. The act of 
transformation here challenges the state of homo-
23. David Scott. Gilbert Simondon’s Psychic and Collective Individuation: A Critical 
Introduction and Guide. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014, 77.
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forms of abstraction, using Whitten’s words, but 
closer to what he has called ‘conceptual painting’—
where there is no destination towards the reinstate-
ment of a pre-existent human category, but a journey 
towards the conditions by which something new can 
emerge.
Abu-Mostafa, Yaser S., Malik Magdon-Ismail, and Hsuan-Tien Lin. Learning from Data: 
A Short Course. S.l.: AMLbook.com, 2012.
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